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FISHER V. UNITED STATES: COMPELLED WAIVER OF
FOREIGN BANK SECRECY AND THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
INTRODUCTION
The Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition1 recently investigated the possible diver-
sion to the Nicaraguan contra resistance2 of money from arms sales to
Iran.3 The committee believed that the funds were diverted through a
bank account in a foreign jurisdiction and that retired Major General
Richard V. Secord controlled the alleged account.4 After General Se-
cord refused to cooperate with the committee and authorize the release
of records from the alleged account,5 the committee attempted to gain
access to the records by seeking a court order compelling him to sign a
consent directive.6
The government uses consent directives in an attempt to circumvent
the restrictive bank secrecy laws of certain foreign jurisdictions.7 Gener-
1. The Select Committee was created by Senate resolution. See S. Res. 23, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. 589 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987).
2. The "contras" is a counter-revolutionary insurgency group attempting to over-
throw the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. See Report of the Congressional Com-
mittees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H.R. Rep. No. 100-433, S. Rep. No. 100-
216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Report].
3. See New York Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at A13, col. 1. For the findings of the
Senate committee, see Iran-Contra Report, supra note 2.
4. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1987, at Al1, col. 3; accord Iran-Contra Report, supra note
2, at 4.
5. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1987, at All, coL 3.
6. See Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F.
Supp. 562, 563 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987); see also S. Res.
170, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S3555-56 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1987) (authoriz-
ing Committee to seek court order).
Compulsion, for the purposes of this Note, differs from coercion, which occurs in po-
lice interrogation cases. In interrogations, testimony is compelled by means of physical
or psychological coercion. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966). Consent
directives are obtained through judicial process, with attendant sanctions of contempt for
noncompliance. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
7. See, eg., United States v. Cook, 678 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (govern-
ment obtained records from a Cayman Islands bank). Certain foreign jurisdictions are
notorious for their highly protective bank secrecy laws. See R. Blum, Offshore Haven
Banks, Trusts, and Companies 23-28 (1984) (listing, among others, the Bahamas, the
British Antilles, and Switzerland); see also Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore
Banks and Companies: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the [Senate] Committee on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1983)
(testimony of Glenn L. Archer, Ass't Att'y Gen., Tax Div., Dep't of Justice) (discussing
use and growth of offshore banking jurisdictions). Banks in such foreign jurisdictions
may release information to United States authorities if the individual controlling the ac-
count authorizes such a release. See, eg., United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1032 &
n.14 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing the Cayman Confidential Relationships [Preservation] Law);
United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 816 n.2 (11th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 469 U.S.
932 (1984). The fact that a witness signs a directive, however, does not make the release
of records certain because, for example, a foreign jurisdiction might refuse to recognize a
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ally, consent directives authorize any bank to which they are presented to
release records from any account over which the subscriber has signatory
authority.8 General Secord argued that compelling him to sign the con-
sent directive would violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.9 The court agreed with General Secord and refused to
issue the order.1
Lower courts considering whether the compelled signing of a consent
directive violates a witness' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
inationI1 apply the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Fisher
v. United States."2 The Court in Fisher held that when the government
directive. See, e.g., In re Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, Law 16 of 1976,
Cause No. 269 of 1984 (Grand Ct. Cayman Islands July 24, 1984).
8. Consent directives usually contain qualified language, authorizing the release of
documents only if they exist, and may or may not name the bank from which the records
are sought. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 796 app.
(1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 815 n.1 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 932 (1984); In re Grand Jury Investigation, Doe, 599 F. Supp. 746, 748 n.4
(S.D. Tex. 1984), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Doe, 775 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). The consent directive at issue in United States v. A Grand
Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1987), provides a good example:
I, [witness], of the State of New York in the United States of America, do
hereby authorize and direct any bank, trust company, or other financial institu-
tion located outside of the territorial United States at which I have or have had
an account of any kind, or at which any corporation has or has had an account
of any kind upon which I am or have been authorized to draw, to disclose all
information and deliver copies of all documents of every nature in the posses-
sion or control of such bank, trust company, or other financial institution which
relate to any such accounts, together with a certificate attesting to the authen-
ticity of any and all such documents, to any agent or employee of the United
States Government who presents a copy of this Consent Directive which has
been certified by the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York to such bank, trust company, or other financial institu-
tion, and this Consent Directive shall be irrevocable authority for doing so.
Id. at 115.
9. See Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F.
Supp. 562, 564 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987). The fifth
amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. This privilege may
be invoked in grand jury proceedings and by witnesses. See Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 559 (1892); see also Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History
and Judicial History, 84 Pol. Sci. Q. 1, 20 (1969).
10. See Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F.
Supp. 562, 564, 566 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987). The banks
eventually released the records after the Swiss government gave its approval. See N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
11. Generally, this issue arises in grand jury investigations when a subpoena or court
order is directed at the target of the investigation. See, e.g., Two Grand Jury Contemnors
v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1168 (2d Cir.) (subpoena), petition for cert. filed sub nom.
Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1987) (No. 87-517); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 792 (1st Cir. 1987) (court order); In re United
States v. Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131, 1132 (1985) (subpoena and court order). For the
purposes of this Note, "witness" denotes witnesses or defendants in criminal prosecu-
tions, as well as targets of grand jury investigations.
12. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Fisher dealt with the production of a preexisting document,
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seeks to obtain existing documents from a witness, the privilege against
self-incrimination is violated only if, in producing those documents, the
witness is "compelled to make a testimonial communication that is
incriminating." 13
Although lower courts considering the constitutionality of consent di-
rectives agree that the act of producing a consent directive is com-
pelled,14 they reach conflicting conclusions whether the act rises to a
testimonial communication. 5 Furthermore, they also disagree whether
the act of producing a consent directive is incriminating.16
This Note argues that the act of producing a consent directive does not
violate a witness' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Part I discusses the three components of fifth amendment analysis under
the Fisher standard--compulsion, testimonial communication, and in-
not the compelled creation of a document. See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
Fisher is not, however, inapposite. The Court in Fisher drew support from cases concern-
ing the creation of physical exemplars, such as writing samples. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at
409; see also infra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing creation of documents).
13. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408, 410 (emphasis omitted); accord United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605, 611 (1984).
14. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 792 (Ist Cir.
1987); United States v. A Grand Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1987); In re
United States v. Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131, 1132 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 816 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); Senate Select
Comm. on Secret Miltary Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562, 564 (D.D.C.),
vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987); United States v. Pedro, 662 F. Supp. 47, 48
(W.D. Ky.), aff'd on rehearing, 662 F. Supp. 49 (1987).
15. Several courts hold that producing the directive is not testimonial because it
makes no assertions regarding the existence or location of the bank records or the wit-
ness' control over those records. See United States v. A Grand Jury Witness, 811 F.2d
114, 117 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131, 1132 (5th Cir 1985);
United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984);
United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Quigg,
48 A.F.T.R.2d 81-5953, 5955 (D. Vt. 1981).
Other courts hold that the act is testimonial because it adds to the sum total of the
government's knowledge by confirming both the existence of the bank records and the
witness' control over those records. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814
F.2d 791, 793 (lst Cir. 1987); Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987);
United States v. Pedro, 662 F. Supp. 47, 49 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd on rehearing, 662 F. Supp.
49 (1987). Two courts hold that the act of consenting is itself a testimonial communica-
tion. See Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 793; Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 565.
16. Courts holding that a consent directive is not testimonial generally do not reach
the question of incrimination. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1039-40 (2d
Cir. 1985); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 817 n.4 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 469
U.S. 932 (1984). Others do and hold that a consent directive is not incriminating. See
United States v. Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131, 1132 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 249 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). Still others hold that a consent direc-
tive incriminates the witness because it provides a link in the chain of evidence establish-
ing that the witness knew of or controlled the accounts. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1987); Senate Select Comm. on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562, 565-66 (D.D.C.), vacated as
moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987); United States v. Pedro, 662 F. Supp. 47, 48 (W.D.
Ky.), aff'd on reh'g, 662 F. Supp. 49 (1987).
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crimination-and considers each separately. Part II applies the Fisher
standard to consent directives to determine whether they are unconstitu-
tional. This Note concludes that the act of producing a consent directive
does not violate the fifth amendment because the act neither manifests a
testimonial communication, nor incriminates the witness.
I. FISHER v. UNITED STA TES
In Fisher v. United States, 7 the Supreme Court propounded a standard
for evaluating an alleged violation of a witness' fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' 8 The Court stated that the privilege attaches
when a witness is compelled to make an incriminating, testimonial com-
munication.19 In considering whether the production of documents vio-
lates the privilege, the Court rejected a formalistic approach that looked
to the nature of the documents produced."0 Rather, the Court focused its
analysis on the conduct that the government sought to compel-the act
of producing documents.2 ' Lower courts, consequently, must examine
the act of production itself, and not necessarily the contents of the under-
17. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
18. Id. at 408; accord United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611 (1984).
19. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408; accord Doe, 465 U.S. at 613.
20. Prior to the Fisher decision, fifth amendment analysis derived from Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), holding that an individual is privileged from produc-
ing his private papers. See id. at 630. Boyd spawned several refinements based upon its
implicit private-public distinction. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 92
(1974) (documents belonging to a partnership not privileged; documents belonging to sole
proprietorship are); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944) (privilege applies to
individuals, not unincorporated associations); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478,
489-90 (1913) (corporation has no claim to privilege). This formalistic approach conceiv-
ably could defeat the accusatorial system and its goal of obtaining the truth, see Brown v.
United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958); infra note 49, when, for example, courts cannot
compel a witness to produce relevant documents simply because they are private papers.
The Court in Fisher reformulated fifth amendment analysis, see Mosteller, Simplifying
Subpoena Law: Taking the Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1987), and
apparently repudiated Boyd, see United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Heidt, The Fifth Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cut-
ting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49 Mo. L. Rev. 439, 471 (1984). Whether the various excep-
tions and refinements to the holding in Boyd remain valid has been the subject of debate.
See, e.g., Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege and Compelled Production of Corporate Papers
After Fisher and Doe, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 935 (1986) (discussing the privilege of a
custodian of corporate records); Note, Organizational Papers and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1986) (discussing personal and corporate docu-
ments); Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege for Producing Corporate Documents, 84 Mich.
L. Rev. 1544 (1986) (discussing documents held in a representative capacity). Moreover,
the Court in Fisher reserved consideration of whether private papers are protected. See
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414.
21. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976); accord United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984). In so doing, the Court in Fisher rejected both an
analysis based on the nature of documents, see supra note 20, and privacy as the policy
supporting the fifth amendment, see Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409. The prevailing policy sup-
porting the fifth amendment, then, is the maintenance of an accusatorial system of justice,
with elimination of an inquisitorial system. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52, 55 (1964); see also O'Brien, The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Her-
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lying documents,22 to determine if it is compelled, testimonial, and
incriminating.
A government request for documents, however, may involve two dif-
ferent types of production. The government may request the production
of an existing document.23 In this type of case, any communications con-
veyed by the contents of the document are irrelevant to the fifth amend-
ment analysis because the government did not compel the creation of the
contents.24 Consequently, a court must examine only the act of produc-
ing or delivering the requested document to determine if that act con-
tains any compelled, incriminating, and testimonial admissions.' The
government also may request that the witness first create, and then de-
liver, a document.26 Because the compelled act includes not only deliv-
mits and the Burger Court, 54 Notre Dame Law. 26, 55 (1978) (discussing accusatorial
system).
An accusatorial system of justice demands that "the government seeking to punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than
by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). Forcing the witness to provide evidence against himself
shifts the burden to that witness and contradicts the accusatorial system. See Geyh, The
Testimonial Component of the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 36 Cath. U.L Rev. 611,
618 (1987).
22. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-11 (1976); accord United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984). In other words, there must be "a causal link between
the act of compulsion and the creation of testimonial evidence." Webb & Ferguson,
United States v. Doe: The Supreme Court and the Fifth Amendment, 16 Loyola U. Chi.
LJ. 729, 738 (1985); see also infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (detailing situa-
tions where act of production relevant).
23. See, eg., United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Beattie, 541 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Empaneled on Jan. 17, 1980, 505
F. Supp. 1041 (D.N.J. 1981). In Fisher, the Court considered two such cases: in each,
attorneys had been asked to produce documents they held for their clients. See Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394 (1974).
24. See id. at 409-10; accord United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1984); see
also C. McCormick, McCormick on Evidence 305 (F_. Cleary, et al., revs. 3d ed. 1984)
("[O]nce information is voluntarily placed in written form, the privilege provides no pro-
tection against the use of compulsion by the government to obtain access to the document
and its informational contents.").
25. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. The Court argued that
[t]he act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena ... has communica-
tive aspects ... wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compli-
ance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded
and their possession or control by the taxpayer. It also would indicate the tax-
payer's belief that the papers are those described in the subpoena.
Id. (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)).
26. See eg., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (involving statute requiring
reporting of accidents by leaving name and address of drivers involved at scene);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1968) (involving statute requiring regis-
tration of illegal wagering activities by completion and filing of tax forms); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (requiring creation and production of handwrit-
ing exemplar); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 792 (lst Cir.
1987) (requiring creation and production of consent directive); see also C. McCormick,
supra note 24, at 305 ("The act of placing information in written form is probably testi-
monial .... [A] witness could not be compelled to write out rather than orally articulate
self-incriminating information." (footnote omitted)).
1987]
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ery of the document to the government, but creation of its substance as
well, the contents of the document must be analyzed as part of the act of
production. 7
The three-pronged standard created by the Court in Fisher for analyz-
ing the production of documents has engendered confusion in the lower
courts. Of the three prongs, the testimonial communication prong has
proven the most problematic to apply;2 8 compulsion is usually obvious,
29
and the parameters of what constitutes incrimination are well-settled.30
Despite the manner in which the Court segmented the analysis,31 some
lower courts and commentators seem to make the fulfillment of the
prongs interdependent.3 2 To apply the analysis in Fisher properly, how-
ever, careful distinction must be made between the three prongs that
comprise the standard, considering each on its own.
A. The Compulsion Requirement
Fisher requires that the act of production be compelled in order to
implicate the fifth amendment.33 Compulsion occurs whenever a witness
who is requested to produce a document must choose either to produce
that which is demanded or to face a sanction of contempt for failure to
comply.34 Because the privilege is personal, 35 possession, not ownership,
of the documents sought to be produced serves as the axis upon which
27. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.
1987); Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F. Supp.
562, 565 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987); cf Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n. II (1976) ("[U]nless the Government has compelled the [wit-
ness] to write the document, (citations omitted), the fact that it was written by him is not
controlling with respect to the Fifth Amendment issue.").
28. Compare, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir. 1984)
(compelling a person to write out what is dictated to him held testimonial when sought to
determine how witness spells a particular word) with, eg., United States v. Pheaster, 544
F.2d 353, 372 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The manner of spelling a word is no less an 'identifying
characteristic' than the manner of crossing a 't' or looping an 'o'. All may tend to iden-
tify .. . the author of a writing without involving the content or message of what is
written. No protected communication is involved."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
29. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 14.
30. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
31. The Court in Fisher separated the testimonial communication and incrimination
requirements. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). Failure to meet one
requirement destroys any claim of the privilege. See id. at 408. For example, a physical
exemplar has an incriminating effect because it might be used to link the witness with an
event or condition, yet it does not violate the privilege because it lacks testimonial charac-
ter. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
32. See, eg., United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1983) (confus-
ing the testimonial requirement with the incrimination requirement by stating that testi-
monial character depends upon whether the act "supplies a necessary link in the
evidentiary chain"), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); Geyh, supra note 21, at 638 (argu-
ing that an act must be incriminating on its face to be testimonial).
33. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 396-97.
34. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979); see also United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) ("[a] government subpoena compels the holder of the
document to perform an act").
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the question whether a witness has a valid claim turns.3 6 The act of pro-
ducing documents belonging to another involves no compulsion of the
owner; only the one actually compelled to perform the act possesses a
colorable objection.37 Thus, despite the fact that the compulsion require-
ment is an essential element of the privilege against self-incrimination, it
is relatively easy to satisfy.
B. The Testimonial Communication Requirement
After establishing the compelled nature of an act of production, Fisher
requires that a court determine whether the act manifests a testimonial
communication.3" Although the Court did not delineate explicitly what
it considered to be sufficiently testimonial to bring a communication
within the purview of the privilege,39 it did establish guidelines that offer
a framework for a concise definition: a testimonial communication must
assert or admit a fact of evidentiary significance."
An act of production becomes a communication when it makes an im-
plicit factual admission.4' For example, producing documents pursuant
to a subpoena "tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded
and their possession or control"'42 by the witness. Furthermore, when
35. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
36. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1976); White, 322 U.S. at 699.
37. See e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (party in-
criminated by evidence produced by a third party suffers no fifth amendment violation);
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973) ("The basic complaint of petitioner
stems from the... divulgence of the possibly incriminating information.... Yet such
divulgence, where it does not result from coercion of the suspect herself, is a necessary
part of... law enforcement...."); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 474
(1976) (holding warranted search and seizure of documents by the police, without assist-
ance from the possessor of the documents, presents no compulsion).
38. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); accord United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611 (1984).
39. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) ("These questions... do not
lend themselves to categorical answers; their resolution may ... depend on the facts and
circumstances of particular cases . . . ."); see also Geyh, supra note 21, at 635 ("The
Court's failure to offer any guidance... leaves the impression that its decisions... are
purely arbitrary.").
40. Geyh, supra note 21, at 614; Mosteller, supra note 20, at 15-16; see Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372-74 (1951); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 359
(1923), aff'd on reh'g, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States,
826 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., concurring), petition for cerL filed sub nom.
Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1987) (No. 87-517).
Fisher does not limit admissions of evidentiary significance to admissions of fact. This
reading, however, comports with the policy of preventing disclosures relied upon to show
the witness' truth telling. See Geyh, supra note 21, at 637; see also infra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text (discussing fifth amendment requirement of "truth-telling"). The
specter of perjury arises only when the government requires the witness to disclose fac-
tual information. See Webb & Ferguson, supra note 22, at 745-47.
41. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976); accord United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1984).
42. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410; see also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)
19871
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the government requires a witness to create a document, the contents of
the document also may make factual admissions.43 In either case, the
fact admitted becomes testimonial only when it has evidentiary
significance.'
An admission made in the act of production has evidentiary signifi-
cance if it adds to the sum of the government's knowledge.45 If the act
contains admissions that are "foregone conclusion[s], ' 46 the act does not
rise to a testimonial communication.47 The essence of the foregone con-
clusion theory is that the act of production violates the fifth amendment
only when the government must "rely[] on the 'truthtelling' of the [wit-
ness]." 48 In other words, the privilege is violated if the government has
(production implicitly represents that documents produced are those requested by the
subpoena); Mosteller, supra note 20, at 12-13 (same).
43. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (reporting requirement
compelled the factual admission of participation in an accident); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 48-49 (1968) (tax filing requirement compelled the factual admission
of illegal wagering activity).
44. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
45. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976); Mosteller, supra note 20, at
32. This argument assumes that the government will ignore an admission if they already
possess equivalent information, and not introduce into evidence those relevant, but dupli-
cative, admissions. See id at 32.
46. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. Foregone conclusions are admissions made by the act of
production which add "little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's informa-
tion." Id.
47. See id. For example, an act of production becomes a testimonial communication
when that act serves to establish the previously unknown existence or location of the
documents requested. See id.; see, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 & n. 11
(1984) (upholding district court decision that stated that" 'enforcement of the subpoenas
would compel [the witness] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession,
and that they are authentic.' ") (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled March 19, 1980,
541 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, sub nom. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)); In re Katz, 623 F.2d 122, 126
(2d Cir. 1980) (disclosure of certificates of incorporation of evidentiary significance be-
cause it shows witness' connection with corporation).
48. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976); see also J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2264, at 379 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (privilege protects against forms of "process rely-
ing on [the witness'] moral responsibility for truthtelling"). Thus, even a communication
that does not disclose a fact might be testimonial if that communication makes a disclo-
sure that is used for the truth of its contents. For instance,
[s]ome tests seemingly directed to obtain 'physical evidence,' for example, lie
detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To
compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to deter-
mine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether
willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
In essence, disclosures, or even omissions, that reveal something about a person's mem-
ory, or the state or operation of his mind, are testimonial if the government relies upon
the truth of those disclosures and omissions. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465
(1981). In Estelle, the government introduced at trial the opinion of a psychiatrist re-
garding the accused's propensity to commit violent acts. See id. at 459-60. The assess-
ment of the accused was based, in part, upon his failure to evince any guilt or remorse.
See id. at 464 nn.8 & 9. The Court stated that the introduction of the psychiatrist's
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no means of verifying the accuracy of the admission other than by rely-
ing upon the fact that the witness made it.49
Under the truth-telling rubric, however, not all admissions supplying
new information are testimonial. For example, merely by producing that
which is requested, the witness admits he is able to comply with the re-
quest.50 However, the ability to comply, although not a foregone conclu-
sion, usually is a self-evident fact that does not require the government to
rely upon the "truth-telling" of the witness.5
Similarly, when the government compels a witness to create a docu-
ment, merely writing or repeating its contents does not rise to the level of
a testimonial communication. 2 The compelled creation of a document
statements into evidence violated the fifth amendment because the government "used as
evidence against [the accused] the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial psychi-
atric examination." Id at 465.
49. This emphasis upon truth telling is consistent with the policy of "preventing the
unfairness that results when a person must face 'the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt' .... Vindicating that policy would lead to a requirement that a
statement must assert the truth of something in order to be within the privilege." Two
Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1174 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J.
concurring) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)), petition
for cert filed sub nor. Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1987) (No.
87-517). One commentator points out that this focus on what he terms the "trustworthi-
ness of the evidence" prevents the compulsion of false testimony, and thereby maximizes
the "efficacy of the criminal process by enhancing protection of the innocent and detec-
tion of the guilty." Geyh, supra note 21, at 618-19. The testimonial requirement, then,
"prevents the government from compelling potentially unreliable communications, while
enabling it to obtain a variety of probative nontestimonial evidence." Id. at 619; see also
C. McCormick, supra note 24, at 287 (compelled, self-incriminating evidence inherently
unreliable). This comports with the policy of preserving the accusatorial system of jus-
tice. See supra note 21.
50. See Geyh, supra note 21, at 638.
51. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976); see. e g., California v. Byers,
402 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971) (act of stopping and leaving an address is "an essentially
neutral act," not a testimonial communication). Thus, a handwriting exemplar, for ex-
ample, would become a testimonial communication only when the government seeks to
ascertain if the witness can write Although it is not evident before the act of production,
admission of ability to comply would not be testimonial in such a case because it is obvi-
ously taken for granted-it is a "truism." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
52. See, eg., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (holding handwriting
exemplars nontestimonial); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973) (permitting
compulsion of voice recordings because they "were to be used solely to measure the phys-
ical properties of the witnesses' voices, not for the testimonial or communicative content
of what was to be said").
The mere fact that a witness must assist or cooperate with the government in its search
for evidence is irrelevant to the issue of testimonial communications. The Court has
upheld the government's acquisition and use of exemplars without regard to whether the
individual simply needs to sit passively while a blood sample is taken, see eg., Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966), or whether the defendant actively must assist the
government by speaking, see eg., Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 7, writing his name, see. eg.,
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967), or putting on clothing, see, eg., Holt v.
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910). Phrased in terms of truth telling, "[t]he
veracity of nontestimonial evidence [such as an exemplar]. . . is normally going to be
unaffected by whether such evidence is obtained with the active assistance of the ac-
cused-" Geyh, supra note 21, at 618; see, eg., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765
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manifests a testimonial communication only when the witness "restate[s],
repeat[s], or affirm[s] the truth of the contents." 53 Otherwise, the gov-
ernment does not rely upon the witness' "truth-telling" in repeating the
substance of the document.
An act of production has evidentiary significance and therefore
manifests a testimonial communication, regardless of whether it is a fore-
gone conclusion, if the act authenticates the documents produced.54 To
be admissible into evidence for authentication purposes, the act must es-
tablish that the document genuinely is what it purports to be.55
C. The Incrimination Requirement
After establishing the compelled and testimonial character of an act of
production, Fisher requires that a court determine whether the act in-
criminates the witness.56 Incrimination occurs when a witness is com-
pelled to provide information that, when placed in the chain of evidence,
helps to prosecute him.57 Such incriminating information includes dis-
closures that provide evidence of a crime5" or that lead to further evi-
dence.59 These disclosures, however, must threaten the witness with
"substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of
(1966) (petitioner's "participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the
[blood] test, which depended on chemical analysis and on that alone."). In essence, an
exemplar usually does not involve any conscious action of the witness' mind other than
performing certain physical motions. Reliance upon the witness does become an issue,
however, when the witness might wilfully alter the substance of the exemplar, such as by
altering his voice. See Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
Extorting Physical Evidence From a Suspect, 43 S. Cal. L. Rev. 597, 623-24 (1970); see
also supra note 48 (discussing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 464 (1981)).
53. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976); accord United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984); see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1973) (voice
recordings).
54. See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 412-13 & n.12; accord Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13; see also
United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir. 1983) (authenticating use adds
testimonial value to otherwise non-testimonial acts), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984).
See generally Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (defining authentication as "evidence sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims").
55. See Fed. R. Evid. 901; Mosteller, supra note 20, at 16. In Fisher, the Court stated
that the act of production would not serve to authenticate the documents produced be-
cause "production would express nothing more than the [witness'] belief that the papers
are those described in the subpoena. The [witness] would be no more competent to au-
thenticate the accountant's workpapers by producing them than he would be to authenti-
cate them if testifying orally." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412-13 (1976)
(footnote omitted).
56. See id. at 408; accord United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613 (1976).
57. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950). In Hoffman, the Court ruled that questions "designed to draw
information as to petitioner's contacts and connection with the fugitive.., would ...
forge links in a chain of facts imperiling petitioner with conviction." Hoffman, 341 U.S.
at 488.
58. See id. at 486-87.
59. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972) (citing Hoffman, 341 U.S.
at 486).
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incrimination"'  at the moment of production.
II. CONSENT DIRECTIVES
In applying the Fisher standard to consent directives, courts must con-
sider the contents of the directive as part of the act of production.6
Although the witness does not draft the consent directive, his signature
indicates his adoption or affirmation of its contents.62 Those words as-
sume significance because both the government and the foreign bank offi-
cials must rely upon them as a statement by the witness that he is
waiving his right to bank secrecy. 3 Application of the Fisher standard to
the act of producing a consent directive reveals that such production
does not violate the fifth amendment. 4
A. Compulsion
The act of producing a consent directive clearly meets the compulsion
requirement. The government attempts to obtain a signature on a con-
sent directive either by seeking a court order directing the witness to
sign65 or by attaching the directive to a subpoena duces tecum.66 Failure
to comply with either subjects the witness to a sanction for contempt,67
60. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968); see Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486;
C. McCormick, supra note 24, at 32 (Supp. 1987); see e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S.
424, 431 (1971) (statute requiring drivers involved in accidents to leave their name and
address at the accident scene does not "entail... substantial risk of self-incrimination"
despite the potential of forming a link in the chain because no admission of liability is
involved).
61. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
62. See Black's Law Dictionary 1239 (5th ed. 1979) ("sign" defined as "[t]o affix one's
name to a writing... for the purpose of authenticating or executing it, or to give it effect
as one's act. ... Tlo ratify by hand or seal") (emphasis added).
63. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
64. Witnesses have argued that the compelled signing of a consent directive violates
due process because it forces the witness to make a false statement that he "consents."
See, e.g., Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed sub nor. Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30,
1987) (No. 87-517); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir.
1987); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 n.7 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
932 (1984). Courts facing the issue, however, have agreed that if the directive states that
it is signed under protest or court order, no due process violation exists. See Contemnors,
826 F.2d at 1171; Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818 n.7.
65. See e.g., Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1167 (2d
Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.LW. 3327 (U.S. Sept.
30, 1987) (No. 87-517); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 792 (1st
Cir. 1987); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 816 (11th Cir. 1984).
66. See United States v. A Grand Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1987); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Thier), 767 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131, 1132 (5th Cir. 1985).
67. See Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1167 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. filed Sept.
30, 1987) No. (87-517); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 792 (1st
Cir. 1987); United States v. A Grand Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 816 (11th Cir.), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984);
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the sine qua non of compulsion.68
B. Testimonial Communication
The act of producing a consent directive, however, fails to rise to the
level of a testimonial communication. At the threshold level, the act of
production analysis limits courts to examining whether the act itself, at
the time of production, violates the fifth amendment. 69 Thus, the con-
tents of any bank records released are irrelevant to the testimonial aspect
of the witness' claim because the act the witness is required to perform
involves neither creating nor producing bank records.70 The act of pro-
ducing the consent directive does, however, require the witness to write
the exact words the government wants him to write.71 Although the gov-
ernment intends this act to assist in obtaining information that is damag-
ing to the witness, 72 merely being compelled to assist the government in
its search for evidence does not violate the fifth amendment. 73 Despite
the fact that the act of producing a directive ultimately may result in the
release of information damaging to the witness, that fact does not make
the act testimonial because release of this information results from a se-
quence of subsequent, extrinsic events.74
Under Fisher, an act must make an admission of fact to be testimo-
In re Grand Jury 84-2 (Doe), No. 86-2663, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. Feb. 13, 1987) (unpub-
lished opinion reported at 812 F.2d 1404), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 64 (1987).
68. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
70. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1039 (2d Cir. 1985).
71. See, eg., United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 820 (1 1th Cir.) (Clark, J., dis-
senting), cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-
0090 (Nov. 16, 1987).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 827 F.2d 682, 683 (11th Cir. 1987)
(sought to gain access to bank records connected to alleged cocaine distribution); United
States v. A Grand Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1987) (sought to gain access
to deposited proceeds of alleged extortion and kickback scheme); United States v.
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 816 (11th Cir.) (sought to gain access to records of income alleg-
edly diverted in avoidance of federal income taxes), cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984).
73. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
74. See United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818-19 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 932 (1984); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); see
also United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1039 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Since the only commu-
nication [the witness] was compelled to make was the direction to the bank, that direction
is the only possible source of a Fifth Amendment violation."); cf Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) ("participation [in a blood test], except as a donor, was
irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that
alone").
A hypothetical serves to illustrate the reasoning involved. Suppose Major General Se-
cord was compelled to utter the words "open sesame" into a tape recorder. Production
of this voice exemplar would not violate his fifth amendment privilege. See United States
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973). Suppose further that certain types of bank vaults open
upon the voice identification of the individual controlling the contents of the vault. The
government could then use Secord's voice exemplar to open a vault and obtain bank
records establishing his role in criminal activities. Despite being compelled and incrimi-
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nial." The act of producing a consent directive, however, neither explic-
itly nor implicitly admits, confirms, or denies the existence of, 6 or
control over,77 any bank accounts or records. The language of the con-
sent directive is speculative,78 stating that documents are to be released
only if they exist.7 9 Moreover, the potential effectiveness of any consent
directive is uncertain. Foreign banks cannot release records if they do
not exist, nor will they release records if the bank or jurisdiction refuses
to recognize the directive."0 Thus, the act of producing a consent direc-
tive does not admit tacitly that the consent directive will be effective.
An act also may manifest a testimonial communication if it compels
nating, the exemplar, by such use, would not be transformed into a testimonial commumi-
cation. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
The consent directive Major General Secord was to sign does not differ from the hypo-
thetical voice exemplar. Neither the directive nor the exemplar makes any admission
apart from the disclosure of self-evident truisms. See supra notes 50-51 and accompany-
ing text.
75. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
76. See United States v. Cid-Molina, 767 F.2d 1131, 1132 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); United
States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
77. The release of bank records in response to the presentation of a consent directive
does not actually prove control over an account by a witness. See United States v.
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 (1 1th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); United States v.
Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). Indeed, the release by the bank of
records is not part of the witness' act of producing a directive. See United States v.
Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1039 (2d Cir. 1985).
78. See Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1170 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30,
1987) (No. 87-517); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985);
see, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 796 app. (Ist Cir. 1987);
United States v. A Grand Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1987); United States
v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 815 n.1 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984).
79. See Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1170 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30,
1987) (No. 87-517); In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 797 (Ist Cir.
1987) (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984).
If, however, the consent directive specifically names a bank or account, without any
qualifying or speculative language, the directive would rise to the level of a testimonial
admission of the account's existence. See United States v. Cook, 678 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D.
Ohio 1987).
Moreover, the government's argument that the directive's speculative language creates
no threat of the release of records is disingenuous because the government would not seek
the signing of a directive unless it thought that records existed. See, eg., supra notes 4-5
and accompanying text (discussing the Iran-Contra affair).
80. See, e.g., In re Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, Law 16 of 1976,
Cause No. 269 of 1984 (Grand CL Cayman Islands July 24, 1984) (refusing to recognize
compelled consents). See generally, Note, Compelled Waiver of Bank Secrecy in the Cay-
man Islands. Solution to International Tax Evasion or Threat to Sovereignty of Nations?,
9 Fordham Int'l L.J. 680 (1986) (discussing the comity and conflict of laws problems
regarding consent directives). The existence of other means to obtain bank records, see
Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the United
States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 1 (1983),
also creates a possibility that compelled consents will not be recognized.
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the witness to "restate, repeat, or affirm the truth""1 of the contents of
the created document.8 2 Compelling the execution of a consent directive
requires the witness to affirm or adopt the contents of the directive.83
That minimal communication, however, does not entail the disclosure of
a fact that requires the government to rely upon the witness' truth-tell-
ing.84 Restating or affirming the contents of a directive admits nothing
that, under the foregone conclusion theory, adds to the sum of the gov-
ernment's knowledge.8 5 A directive merely contains words with the legal
effect of release;8 6 those words are neither true nor false.
87
Some courts, however, hold that the mere utterance of the words "I
consent" rises to the level of a testimonial act.88 Although the witness
grants consent by signing the directive,8 9 this grant of consent does not
assert a fact that requires reliance by the government upon the witness'
"truth-telling,"' because the ability to grant consent by signing the di-
rective is self-evident. 91
Furthermore, a consent directive contains no significant authenticating
value. The act of signing and delivering a consent directive to the gov-
ernment authenticates only that which was produced-the directive;92
81. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
82. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
84. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 797-98 (1st Cir.
1987) (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248
(N.D.N.Y. 1985). Nor does that communication make a disclosure of the witness' mem-
ory or state or operation of mind. See supra note 48.
85. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
86. The consent directive simply "remove[s] an obstacle to [the production of
records] created by [foreign] law." United States v. Quigg, 48 A.F.T.R.2d 81-5953, 81-
5955 (D. Vt. 1981).
87. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 798 (1st Cir. 1987)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The use to which a consent directive is put will not make the act
of producing that communication testimonial. See supra notes 32, 70-74.
88. See Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 795; Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance
to Iran v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov.
16, 1987).
89. See Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 795.
90. See id. at 798 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Grammatically, this argument is supported
by the distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs. Transitive verbs express "an
action that carries over from an agent or subject to an object." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 2428 (1976). Intransitive verbs express an action or state "as
limited to the agent or subject or as ending in itself." Id. at 1186. "To assert" is a
transitive verb defined as "to state or affirm positively" or "to demonstrate the existence
of (an attribute)." Id. at 131. "To consent," on the other hand, is an intransitive verb
defined as "to express a willingness." Id. at 482. When a witness "consents," that action
is limited to itself and has no "object." Consent is not, then, the same as "assert," which
has a fact, thing, or other information, as an object. It is that object that makes the act
testimonial because it provides the referent raising the testimonial characteristics relating
to facts and truthfulness.
91. Cf Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) (ability to submit a physical
exemplar is a truism and self-evident).
92. Cf Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412-13 & n.12 (1976) (discussing how
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the act of signing does not authenticate any bank records produced as a
result of the consent directive because the directive does not assert that
any records exist.93 Furthermore, in the event that the government even-
tually obtains any records using the directive, only the source bank
would be qualified to authenticate them. 4
C. Incrimination
Despite some courts' holdings that a directive forms a link in the chain
of evidence by proving control over a bank account,9" a consent directive
does not present a real or substantial risk of incrimination. According to
these holdings, the government will introduce a consent directive into
evidence to prove, inferentially, control by the witness over the account
because any records obtained were released in response to presentation of
the directive.9 6 This argument is flawed, however, because the directive
merely authorizes the bank to release records over which the bank be-
lieves the witness has control. 97 Moreover, this inference does not
amount to testimony authenticating the bank records,9" because only the
bank can authenticate its own records.9 9 No act of a witness would be
competent to authenticate records created by and belonging to an-
other."°° Without direct testimony from the bank, the evidentiary value
of the directive is inherently suspect. It represents only weak, circum-
stantial evidence of the witness' control of and link to the bank
records. 11 Thus, a consent directive will not be sufficiently probative of
act of producing personal papers would authenticate them, while producing papers cre-
ated by another would not, because "the [witness] did not prepare the papers and could
not vouch for their accuracy.").
93. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
94. See Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1174 n.5 (2d
Cir.) (Newman, J., concurring), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Coe v. United States, 56
U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1987) (No. 87-517); United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d
814, 818-19 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984); United States v. Browne, 624 F.
Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 412-13
(1976) (where government was seeking from taxpayer records prepared by an accountant,
taxpayer could not authenticate those papers by producing them). But see In re Grand
Jury 83-8 (MIA) Subpoena Duces Tecum, 611 F. Supp. 16, 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (act of
production was the "sole means of authenticating the documents"). For example, the
language of one directive requests authenticating documentation from the bank, thus in-
dicating the government's recognition that the directive possesses little authenticating
value. See United States v. A Grand Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1987).
95. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1987);
Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F. Supp, 562,
566 (D.D.C.), vacated as moot, No. 87-0090 (Nov. 16, 1987).
96. See Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 793; Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 566.
97. See United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 & n.8 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 932 (1984); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
98. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
101. The records produced might not be truly responsive to the directive if, for exam-
ple, the bank misreads the account numbers and releases documents not properly relating
to the witness. Cf United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 818 & n.8 (11th Cir.) (bank
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control to be admissible into evidence as a link in the chain. 10 2
The argument that a consent directive incriminates the witness by
forming a link in the chain of evidence presumes that records will be
released by a bank in response to the presentation of the directive. The
act of producing a consent directive does not violate the fifth amendment
privilege, however, unless this presumption is established at the time of
execution. 10 3 Uncertainty at that time makes the threat that the consent
directive will lead to other evidence too attenuated to present a real and
substantial risk of incrimination.' °4
The conclusion that the compelled signing of a consent directive does
not violate the witness' fifth amendment privilege comports with the out-
come of a balancing of the government's need for accurate information'0 5
against the witness' desire to keep his bank records private.1 6 The truth-
telling orientation in Fisher meshes neatly with the notion that courts are
charged with finding the truth10 7 and that they must make accurate de-
terminations of guilt and innocence.0 8 To this end, according to a famil-
iar maxim, the government is entitled to "every man's evidence."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that there is
a privacy expectation regarding foreign bank records. 10 The Court has
will release documents that it believes belong to the witness; this release does not necessar-
ily contradict the witness' contention that no records belonging to him exist), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 932 (1984); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985)
("the release permits the banks to make their own determination of whether defendant
exercises control over any accounts").
102. See Two Grand Jury Contemnors v. United States, 826 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir.),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Coe v. United States, 56 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Sept. 30,
1987) (No. 87-517); see also Mosteller, supra note 20, at 17 (authenticating tendency of an
admission must have substantial value in establishing a document's admissibility, else any
incrimination would be so trivial as not to implicate the privilege). A consent directive
may assist in the authentication of bank records if it is used to compare signatures. That
alone, however, probably would not suffice to authenticate the records, and would have to
be corroborated by testimony from a more competent source. See supra notes 92-94, 101
and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
104. Cf California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (disclosure of involvement in an
accident may not be incriminating, despite the fact that it may form a link in the chain);
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 54 (1968) ("prospective acts will doubtless ordi-
narily involve only speculative and insubstantial risks of incrimination").
Even if the directive is inadmissible into evidence as authenticating testimony, see supra
note 102, it, however, may incriminate if the government obtains incriminating bank
records through its use. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).
105. See Geyh, supra note 21, at 619.
106. See infra note 114. Compulsion of the signing of a consent directive does not turn
the accusatorial system of justice into an inquisitorial one, because it involves no admis-
sions that may be used against the witness. See supra notes 21, 74-94.
107. See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and
Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 197 (1983).
108. See Webb & Ferguson, supra note 21, at 755; see also supra note 49 (discussing the
"truth-telling" rubric and reliability of evidence).
109. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (quoting United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
110. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 n.4 (1980). Moreover, Fisher re-
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held that no fourth amendment privacy expectation in bank records lo-
cated in the United States exists."' Foreign banks doing business in the
United States may be subpoenaed for their records." 12 That the govern-
ment may eventually obtain foreign bank records through diplomatic
channels l1' indicates that the privacy expectation regarding such records
should be laid to rest as too illusory.1 4 All of these factors militate
against a finding that the act of producing a consent directive is
unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Application of Fisher v. United States. 5 to the act of producing a con-
sent directive reveals that it does not violate a witness' fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Although the act of production is
compelled, it makes no testimonial communication. The act of produc-
jected the argument that a claim of privilege is supportable by the desire for privacy. See
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
111. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976); see also California Bank-
ers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974) (in upholding constitutionality of the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d,
1829b, 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122),
Court ruled that Act's requirement that domestic banks maintain certain records of
transactions does not infringe any privacy expectation).
112. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); see also United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 408 (5th
Cir.) (Cayman Islands bank's officer subpoenaed), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). The
courts considering whether a foreign bank may be compelled to produce records gener-
ally undertake a balancing of the court's need for evidence against the bank's interest in
not violating any laws of its country. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago,
699 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 1983); see, eg., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498-99 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (although foreign banks may be subpoenaed, instant bank may
not, because it was not a party to the action and had acted in good faith throughout
proceedings), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Roe v. United States, 56 U.S.LW. 3326
(U.S. Sept. 4, 1987) (No. 87-395); cf United States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (9th
Cir. 1981) (listing factors to be balanced).
113. See Honegger, supra note 80, at 8-9.
114. This conclusion does not penalize the depositing of funds in offshore banks. De-
positors may have innocuous and justifiable reasons for maintaining foreign accounts.
See id These reasons might derive from certain privacy interests, such as a legitimate
desire to control the flow of public information about oneself, see Dolinko, Is There a
Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1063, 1123
(1986), or as a means of checking the intrusiveness of modem society, see M. Berger,
Taking the Fifth 230 (1980). Illegitimate reasons for depositing assets offshore, however,
also exist, including the "laundering" of unclean or ill-gotten money, see Nadelmann,
Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad- US Foreign Policy and Financial Security Jurisdic-
tions, 18 Inter-Am. L. Rev. 33, 34-35 (1986), or avoidance of income taxes, illegal manip-
ulation of securities markets, insider trading, circumvention of stock margin
requirements, and illegal takeovers of domestic industries, see Foreign Bank Secrecy:
Hearings on S. 3678 and H.R. 15073 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970) (statement of
William Proxmire, Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions). When
the maintenance of overseas bank accounts is suspected to be for illegitimate purposes,
any privacy expectation properly should succumb to the need to ascertain the truth.
115. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
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ing a directive, primarily because of its speculative wording, asserts no
facts of evidentiary significance. Moreover, the threat of incrimination,
although present, is too insubstantial to invoke the fifth amendment.
Although the government can use the consent directive to forge inferen-
tial links in the chain of evidence helping to prosecute the witness, the
resulting chain is too weak to support the incrimination requirement of
Fisher and traditional fifth amendment analysis.
Gordon Hwang
